Joining a Cisco LWAP to a vWLC

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In this video, we take a look at what is required to join a Cisco Lightweight Access Point (LWAP) to a Cisco Virtual Wireless Controller (vWLC).

Devices in this video include:
  1. Cisco vWLC
  2. Cisco LWAP c1600 series
  3. Windows Server 2012 R2 
     

    Updated Notes: 28/09/2019


    Having worked with AP's and WLC's some more, I wanted to share some more notes from things observed in my lab.

    The output below is generated from a C1600 series AP that I have in my lab. The syslog output is generated when the AP attempts to join the WLC. While looking into this, I found a few workarounds and potential bugs associated with this.
     
     

*Sep 28 19:38:19.066: AP has SHA2 MIC certificate - Using SHA2 MIC certificate for DTLS.

*Sep 28 19:38:18.000: %CAPWAP-5-DTLSREQSEND: DTLS connection request sent peer_ip: 192.168.101.2 peer_port: 5246

*Sep 28 19:38:23.999: DTLS_CLIENT_ERROR: ../capwap/base_capwap/dtls/base_capwap_dtls_handshake.c:929 Unexpected message received while expecting HelloVerifyRequest

*Sep 28 19:38:23.999: %DTLS-5-SEND_ALERT: Send FATAL : Unexpected message Alert to 192.168.101.2:5246

*Sep 28 19:38:24.003: %DTLS-5-SEND_ALERT: Send FATAL : Close notify Alert to 192.168.101.2:5246

 

Field Notice: https://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/support/docs/field-notices/639/fn63916.html
You can find some potential workarounds in the above field notice, however if the field notice doesn't provide you with a solution, you could try the following.

  • Configure the WLC to ignore expired certificates using the following command: 
     
     

config ap cert-expiry-ignore ssc enable

config ap cert-expiry-ignore mic enable

 

Kelvin Charles - Network and Cyber Security Professional.

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